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Autonomous control of a spacecraft is an enabling technology that must be developed for 
deep space human exploration. NASA’s current long term human space platform, the 
International Space Station which is in Low Earth Orbit, is in almost continuous 
communication with ground based mission control. This allows near real-time control of all 
the vehicle core systems, including power, to be controlled by the ground. As the focus shifts 
from Low Earth Orbit, communication time-lag and bandwidth limitations beyond 
geosynchronous orbit does not permit this type of ground based operation. This paper 
presents the ongoing work at NASA to develop an architecture for autonomous power control 
system and a vehicle manager which monitors, coordinates, and delegates all the onboard 
subsystems to enable autonomous control of the complete spacecraft.   
I. Introduction 
ASA is continuing to explore deep space exploration, “Expanding human presence into the solar system and to 
the surface of Mars to advance exploration…”1 It is therefore necessary to develop new technologies to solve the 
challenges associated with deep space exploration. One of these enabling technologies is spacecraft automation, 
including the automation of core spacecraft subsystems, e.g. power, communications, thermal, avionics, propulsion, 
etc. The focus on automating these core subsystems stems from current human exploration operations taking place 
aboard the International Space Station (ISS) in Low Earth Orbit (LEO).  Communications with vehicles in LEO are 
nearly instantaneous (taking into account that they use the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite network in 
geosynchronous orbit).  The ability to communicate with vehicles in LEO, enables most of the core systems to be 
operated from the ground or with a great deal of real-time ground intervention. As human space exploration pushes 
further out, especially beyond cislunar space, the communication time increases.  A mission to Mars, or one of its 
natural satellites Demos and Phobos, involves a total travel time of 6 to 9 months and communication latency times 
that can vary anywhere from 6 to 44 minutes2  roundtrip.  
Due to the longer communication times associated with deep space exploration, the ground-based mission control 
center will no longer have the ability to assist the astronauts in real-time to diagnose and correct problems with the 
spacecraft.2  It is anticipated that the astronauts that support these missions will not be experts in the respective 
subsystems required to operate the spacecraft.  Consequently, each of the vehicle core subsystems will contain built 
in intelligence to permit autonomous operation for both normal and contingency operations which includes fault 
diagnosis and corrective actions. 
This paper will describe the most recent ongoing development of an autonomous controller for electrical power 
systems that can be used for a deep space exploration spacecraft. This extends previous work on developing an 
autonomous power control3 which includes developing a control architecture for deep space vehicles,4,5 the use of 
software agents,6 and constructing a control simulation lab for demonstrating this capability.7 This paper will begin 
with a discussion of the representative future power architectures that will be required for deep space exploration 
vehicles. It will describe spacecraft control architecture and how the power controller will integrate with the vehicle, 
followed with a discussion of the autonomous power controller.  Next it will describe the test setup used to evaluate 
the performance of the controller, and finally show some of the test results.  To develop the type of controller 
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envisioned, it will be necessary to employ a detailed real-time simulation to evaluate its performance and ultimately 
verify its functionality.  The strategy to develop this type of simulation is outlined.   
II. Power System Architecture 
Studies have been conducted to develop a notional power architecture for a prospective Deep Space Vehicle, shown 
in Figure 1, which would require an autonomous control system to operate it. 4 This system consists of a Power Module 
and a Habitation Module. The power module is characterized by two independent power channels with multi-level 
cross strapping. The arrays and 
batteries are sized to allow fly 
potential Design Reference 
Missions8 that requires operation in 
other orbits with an eclipse. Each 
power channel operates at 120V, is 
compatible with SAE spec 
AS5698,9 and has a solar array 
regulator to provide conditioned 
power to the main bus switching 
unit (MBSU). From the MBSU, the 
power is used to charge the battery 
during insolation (through the 
battery charge/discharge unit, 
BCDU), or is distributed to the 
power distribution units (PDUs), 
which feed power to the user loads. 
For redundancy and reliability 
considerations, the MBSUs can be 
cross-strapped and each PDU can 
be fed from either power channel. 
Finally, the MBSU can also feed bi-
directional converters that can 
supply or draw power from the 
three Habitat Module docking 
ports. 
III. Spacecraft Control 
A simplified version of the current spacecraft control architecture is shown in Figure 2.  With this control 
architecture, mission operations receives the telemetry from the spacecraft, which includes the status of each critical 
subsystem and operating data, and sends commands to the vehicle. Ground-based mission operations personnel have 
the ability to interpret the vehicle status, make critical decisions based on previous experience and mission objectives, 
and can alter the vehicle commands, including the power profile, reactive layer controller set points, and enable or 
disable loads to meet current and future mission objectives.  Another critical role of the ground controller is to respond 
to faults and develop recovery plans to restore the system to a fully operational state.  Any hard faults, e.g. line short, 
overvoltage, etc., will be detected and mitigated by the electrical power system components (reactive layer).  However, 
mission operations will have to develop a plan to restore power to any loads that have been impacted by the fault.  
Mission operations is also responsible for observing the trends of the system and anticipating future problems, 
typically associated with system degradation, and take corrective action to eliminate potential (future) faults and/or 
mitigate system impact.   
This type of spacecraft control architecture relying on ground-based mission controls to operate the vehicle is 
suitable for LEO since communication with the vehicle can be achieved in real-time.  As human exploration operations 
pushes beyond LEO to deep space, the roundtrip communication time increases and cannot support the needs and 
constraints of these deep space human exploration missions.  For these missions, an autonomous spacecraft controller 
is proposed and shown in Figure 3.    
 
Figure 1. Notional Deep Space Gateway Vehicle Power Architecture 
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The main functional change with the 
autonomous space control architecture, shown 
in Figure 3, is that the planning and execution of 
the vehicle operations is moved from ground 
based mission operations to on-board the 
vehicle. With the autonomous system, mission 
operations sends high-level, longer term mission 
objectives and provides oversight for both the 
vehicle and crew operations.  The spacecraft 
controller becomes a vehicle manager, 
responsible for managing the vehicle operations 
and ensuring that the mission objectives are 
successfully met. To accomplish these tasks, the 
vehicle manager analyzes and coordinates 
amongst all the subsystems and manages global 
(vehicle level) issues between subsystems, crew 
time, and mission objectives, but does not control the actual subsystems. In addition, the vehicle manager is also 
responsible for diagnosing faults that manifest themselves across all systems and then take corrective action.  This 
includes the ability for the vehicle manager to make critical decisions until the ground has the opportunity to provide 
guidance for the vehicle and crew. The vehicle manager is also able to provide recommended actions when a fault 
occurs and is able to re-plan crew time, system operations, etc. after a fault is detected, but is not responsible for fault 
identification or immediate corrective action in the actual subsystem.   
The vehicle manager coordinates with the autonomous subsystem controllers, which are responsible for the safe 
operation of each subsystem and are referred to as the reactive layer that contains the actual hardware components. 
Each of these autonomous controllers are designed to handle local control problems, such as fault detection and 
recovery.  The subsystems operate on a schedule provided by the vehicle manager, which dictates the roles, 
responsibilities, and constraints of the subsystems for the remainder of the planning window, which on the ISS is 
typically for the next 24 hours.   
 
 
 
Figure 2. Simplified current spacecraft control / mission 
operations architecture 
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Figure 3. Simplified autonomous spacecraft control architecture 
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IV. Operation of the Autonomous Power Controller 
The autonomous power controller (APC) is responsible for safely operating the power system (reactive layer) and 
coordinating with the vehicle manger to collectively meet the mission objectives.  The APC mainly provides the 
vehicle manager with an energy availability schedule, the evaluation results from load profiles (schedules) develop 
and proposed by the vehicle manager, electrical power system fault identification information, and power system 
configuration.  The APC also interfaces with the actual electrical power system, sending commands to the hardware 
(switches, voltage set points, etc.) and receiving telemetry.  
The operational philosophy of the autonomous power Controller is covered by two principles: 
1. The reactive control layer will instantaneously contain hard faults and safe the system to minimize 
damage and large deterioration.  Therefore, the reaction time of APC does not have to be instantaneous 
but could be on a slower (multi-second) response. 
2. The autonomous controller will insure that for the long term, the power system is operating safely and 
services the highest priority loads within power system constraints.   
In fulfilling the operating principals stated above the APC will generally operate in one of three states.  These 
operational states were first articulated for terrestrial power system.10  The main operational states are normal, 
emergency and restorative.  The state diagram that shows the states and their definitions are shown in Figure 4.   
A. Normal State 
The system is operating nominally with all operating parameters.  The APC is providing the energy availability to the 
vehicle manager and executing vehicle manager’s 
desired and approved operating plan.  Assuming there 
are no failures it could continue in the state 
indefinitely. 
B. Emergency State 
Some type of fault or anomaly has occurred in the 
power system.  The reactive control will generally put 
the system in a temporary safe mode, however, 
depending on the fault, additional action may need to 
be taken to reconfigure the system (change feeder 
lines, shed loads, etc.) so that it can operate in a 
degraded mode indefinitely.  The system is then 
transitioned to the Restorative State 
C. Restorative State: 
In this state the system is in a safe and stable state but 
in may not be servicing a complete normal load set.  In 
this state, the APC can actually perform the same functions as in the normal state.  This state develops and executes a 
recovery plan to restore the system to a normal state.   
D. State Transitions 
For the system to get to the emergency state, it requires some type of fault in the power system or the communication 
system to produce an uncontrolled transition to get into the emergency state.  Once in the emergency state, APC can 
make a controlled transition to the restorative state.  In the restorative state a second failure could send you back to 
the emergency state in an uncontrolled transition.  In the restorative state the APC can provide a controlled transition 
to the normal state, however, if there is an unseen problem with recovery path, the system could transition back to an 
uncontrolled manner to the restorative state.   
 By using the operating principles outlined above and moving the control and the power system through the various 
operational states depending on the health and fault status of the power system it is possible to have an initial 
instantiation of an autonomous power system controller.  The implementation of how this is done is explained in the 
following section.   
V. Functions of Autonomous Power Controller 
The implementation of APC can be broken down into a few functions that operate independently of each other and 
provide information and action to the APC as a whole.  These functions, or modules of the APC, include an 
 
Figure 4 Autonomous Power Controller State 
Diagram. 
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5 
executioner, reactive layer, fault manager, energy manager, and recovery and restoration planner.  Each of the modules 
operate in concert with each other to implement the operational philosophy above. Descriptions of each of the modules 
and their associated functions is discussed below. 
A. Energy Management 
The energy manager is responsible for operating, monitoring, and communicating the capability of the power 
generation and energy storage system based on external vehicle constraints as well as the system state. These functions 
include: 
x Calculating the battery state of charge (and estimating future state of charge based on the current value) 
x Calculating the solar array energy based on vehicle state vector data and projected vehicle path provided 
by the vehicle manager  
x Calculating the power availability timeline for the pre-defined planning window (power profile and total 
energy availability) 
x Evaluating proposed load schedules for potential issues (such as over drawing from the battery or 
overloading any individual component or feeder line) 
x Provide solar array set points for array pointing  
x Provide voltage set points for array regulation  
x Provide battery charge and discharge set points (to battery charge/discharge unit) 
The energy availability communicates the maximum power that is available to the loads as a function of time, the 
nominal (anticipated) power available to the loads as a function of time, and the total energy available from the source 
over the planning window. The energy availability becomes constraints for the vehicle manager to schedule power 
amongst the loads.  
B. Maintenance, Mitigation, and Recovery 
The maintenance, mitigation, and recovery (MMR) planner is designed to operate when either a fault is detected 
or a fault can be cleared, through either an internal/external reset signal or power cycle and provides the following 
functionality: 
x Develop a new electrical power system configuration based on current system state (and individual 
components availability) 
x Initiate a request to the energy manager to develop a new power availability based on current system state  
(fault condition or clearing of fault) 
x Develop load shed commands based on load current priorities (which were provided by vehicle manager 
and are part of the current executed load schedule) 
C. Fault Management 
The fault manager is responsible for detecting and identifying faults in the electrical power system.  The current 
fault detection strategies that are being investigated and implemented include: 
x Check incoming data for current status from hardware due to a trip (overcurrent or overvoltage) 
x State estimation to check for noisy or erroneous sensor data 
x Communication checks including a heartbeat from each smart component in the system to ensure that the 
smart component is communicating to the controller. 
D. Executive Management (Executioner) 
The executioner oversees the operation of the modules within the APC, changes the state of the APC, and 
communicates information with the vehicle manager.  This includes: 
x Changing the state of the APC (which may end other processes and calculations) 
x Monitor the load schedule and communicate with the vehicle manager if a new load schedule needs to be 
developed (avoid extending the current load schedule if possible) 
x Notify the VM of a fault and provide the updated load schedule with any low priority loads shed 
E. Electrical Power System 
The reactive layer consists of the actual hardware components and interact with the APC by: 
x Implements commands and operates the system based on commands from the APC 
x Sends operating power system data (voltages, currents, etc.) and switch status (on, off, trip) to the APC 
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F. Implementation and Communication 
 Each of the functional modules outlined above are implemented in a multiprocessor environment shown in Figure 
5.  As shown in the figure each of the functional modules resides on its own processor and coordinates with the other 
modules and the APC executioner through a shared database.  This database contains tables that act as communication 
blackboard for the various control modules.  Furthermore, the APC sends commands and gathers data from the reactive 
layer through the database.   
G. External System - Vehicle Manager 
Operating in concert with the APC, the vehicle manager provides monitors and reports activities across the entire 
spacecraft as well as coordinating activity between the various subsystems.  For the power system the vehicle manager 
does the following: 
x Provide communication (command and telemetry) to ground based mission operation 
x Navigation / traffic information for power system to develop power / energy profile 
x Displays caution and warning alarms to the operator and/or ground based mission operation 
x Develop an integrated load schedule for all of the subsystems and crew based on power availability 
provided by the APC 
x Resolve faults between multiple subsystems 
VI. Demonstration of the Autonomous Power Control Testbed 
Current ongoing work at NASA Glenn Research Center in the Power Systems Division includes the design and 
buildup of a prototype testbed and autonomous power control system (APC).  The APC is capable of communicating 
with these systems at the Glenn Research center and the power hardware at the Johnson Space Center (JSC), as shown 
in Figure 6.  For the first phase of this development effort, a simplified power system has been implemented in the 
JSC Integrated Power and Avionics Software (iPAS) test bed and a representative prototype has been implemented at 
GRC.  The simplified system, shown in Figure 7, consists of two power strings.  Each power string contains a battery 
and a regulated solar array which are both connected to a main bus switching unit (MBSU) and connects to a power 
distribution unit (PDU) with eight loads.  The PDUs are connected to the loads via remote power controller (RPC).  
Each PDU is rated for 32 Amps maximum at 120 V (3.84 kW power rating).  The MBSU from one string, or channel, 
is cross tied to the other PDU so that the battery and/or solar array from one channel can actually power the other 
channel’s loads.  In total, there are 16 loads that can be powered by this power system.   
 
Figure 5. Subsystems (components) of the Autonomous Power Controller. 
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The APC is currently being developed on five computers with an additional computer to interface with the hardware 
or, when required, run a MATLAB®/Simulink® (the, Math Works, Inc.) model based on the hardware developed by 
PC Krause & Associates. In addition, the lab contains the ability to interface with JSC through an internal agency 
network. For this past year, the team focused on developing the APC system and demonstrating the APC working in 
the normal mode and the ability to detect and identify faults within the power system. These will be discussed in more 
detail in the following subsections. 
 
A. Nominal Operation (no-fault) 
As previously stated, when in the normal state the electrical power system is operating properly (no faults detected) 
and the main tasks of the APC are to i) respond to requests from the vehicle manager, and ii) monitor the electrical 
power system for faults.  Monitoring of the electrical power system will actually be covered in the next section 
discussing responding to faults.  The two main requests from the vehicle manager is to forecast energy available and 
to approve/implement a new load schedule. 
 The energy forecast consists of a power profile and total energy availability over a pre-defined time range or 
window; for the current work it is assumed to be 2 hours. The peak power and nominal power is defined for the 2 
 
Figure 7 Simplified Deep Space Gateway Power System 
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hours in 5 minute increments.  The peak power is the maximum power that can be delivered to the loads through the 
available hardware, e.g. RPCs.  Typically the peak power would only be reduced if a PDU or RPC becomes 
unavailable for some reason.  The nominal power is the amount of power that is typically required to be delivered to 
the loads.  This value would be determined during the design of the system and in this scenario is assumed to be 75% 
to 80% of the peak power.  The nominal power values are reduced when there is less power available from the power 
and energy storage systems, due to a battery or solar array fault, a short from the battery to the MBSU, etc.  Depending 
on the vehicle manager and its capability, the nominal power can also be reduced when the battery is overdrawn to 
force the loads to reduce their power draw equally over the next planning window.  Note that it is possible to have 
more nominal power available during insolation than eclipse. The energy availability is a single value that is the total 
energy available for the loads over the planning window and is typically the sum of the nominal power over the 
planning window.  This value could be impacted if the battery state of charge is less than the desired battery state of 
charge based on the current position of the vehicle in the orbit. The energy manager has a state of charge profile for 
insolation and eclipse, and if the battery state of charge at the specific instance in time is less than the desired state of 
charge, then the energy availability is reduced in order to increase the state of charge of the battery to the desired over 
the next forecast window.  The power profile from the APC to the vehicle manager with no faults in the system and 
the batteries correctly charged is shown in Table 1.     
 The second request from the vehicle manager is for 
the APC to accept a new load schedule.  Ideally, this 
would be a two-step (or more) process where the APC 
would evaluate the load schedule and if deemed 
acceptable, the APC would implement the schedule.  If 
not acceptable, then the APC would inform the vehicle 
manager of the constraint violation. For the current work, 
the vehicle manager always met the objective and did not 
try to use more power than the APC allowed and 
therefore the APC did not analyze the proposed load 
schedule. In this case, the vehicle manager will send a 
new load schedule and the APC will implement the 
schedule starting from the time it is received.  A load 
schedule from the vehicle manager for PDU #1 is shown in Table 2.  Each load that is powered on for a given time 
unit is assigned a number corresponding to its priority for the time unit.  The priorities range from 1 (highest priority) 
to 16 (lowest priority). A load given a priority 0 is assumed to be turned off.  In the event that a fault occurs and loads 
have to be shed, the lowest priorities will be turned off until the anticipated power (based on assumed load levels) is 
less than the nominal power determined by the current configuration and energy availability.   
B. Faulted Operation 
To demonstrate the fault mode, the APC will be in the normal state and a fault will be inserted into the system.  
There are two different types of faults that are tested in the demonstration, non-critical power and critical power system 
faults. Non-critical power system faults do not impact the distribution of power to the PDUs.  These failures include 
RPC faults, shorts in the line from the RPC to the loads, shorts in the loads, senor faults such as a sensor bias, excessive 
Table 1. Power Profile with an Energy Availability for 
the 2 hour window of 11.52 kW Hours. 
Time 
(time unit) 
Peak Power 
(kW) 
Nominal Power 
(kw) 
1 7.68 5.76 
2 7.68 5.76 
3 7.68 5.76 
4 7.68 5.76 
… … …. 
24 7.68 5.76 
 
Table 2. Load schedule for PDU#1.  Each load that is on is numbered from 1 (highest priority) to 16 
(lowest priority) and is assigned a 0 if the load is off. 
RPC Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 Time 6 Time 23 Time 24 
1 7 0 7 0 7 0 7 0 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 0 7 0 7 0 7 0 7 
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
5 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
6 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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noise, or even signal dropout, etc. Critical power system faults however impact the power distribution system and 
could impact the availability of power.  These faults include battery faults, solar array faults, feeder line faults, etc. 
In the case of a non-critical fault, the APC would begin operating in the normal state and a fault is inserted into 
the system (or model).  The APC fault manager detects and identifies the fault (such as RPC 2-7 sensor bias or RPC 
1-2 faulted open). The fault manager notifies the APC executioner that a non-critical fault has been detected, the 
faulted component, and fault type.  Since this is a non-critical fault, the APC executioner moves the APC from the 
normal state to the restorative state and notifies the vehicle manager of the change in state.  The system continues 
operating and can still respond to requests from the vehicle manager, as done in the normal state.  Once the fault is 
removed, the faulted component’s reset signal is toggled, the APC executioner notifies the vehicle manger that the 
fault has been cleared and updates the list of faulted components, the APC executioner then moves the APC from the 
restorative to normal state. 
In the case of a critical fault, the APC will again be operating in the normal state and a fault is inserted into the 
electrical power system.  Either the electrical power system hardware will detect the fault and take immediate action 
such as opening the switch, or the APC fault manager will detect the fault in the system and then identify the fault that 
is present in the system.  In either case, the fault manager is aware of the fault type and faulted component. The fault 
manager notifies the APC executioner that a critical fault is detected, the faulted component, and fault type.  The APC 
executioner i) moves the APC state from normal to emergency, ii) requests for the recovery and restoration planner to 
create a new configuration for the power system based on the fault, and iii) notifies the vehicle manager that a fault 
occurred, the impacted equipment, and the fault type. This notification is necessary so the vehicle manger knows that 
the APC cannot accept a new load schedule based on the previous energy availability. Once the recovery and 
restoration planner creates a new configuration, it requests a new energy availability based on the fault to determine 
if any loads need to be shed.  Loads will be shed starting with the lowest priority load and will continue to be shed 
until the anticipated power is below the new nominal power based on the new energy profile and new configuration.  
Once the loads are shed, if any, the recovery and restoration planner notifies the APC executioner that the new 
configuration is complete.  The APC executioner notifies the vehicle manager as to what loads have been shed and 
the new energy availability which serves also as a request for a new load schedule based on the current updated energy 
availability.  The vehicle manager then provides the updated load schedule, the APC will implement the new load 
schedule and transition the APC state from emergency to restorative, where the system can safely operate until the 
fault is cleared.   
Once the faulted equipment has been addressed, the faulted component is reset via the reset signal.  At this point, 
since the system is being cleared from a critical fault, the APC executioner requests a new configuration based on the 
new available equipment (since the faulted hardware is now available). It also request a new energy availability profile 
based on the new configuration, which is coordinated through the recovery and restoration planner.  Once this is 
complete, the APC executioner notifies the vehicle manager that the fault has been cleared and of the new energy 
availability.  Once the vehicle manager responds with the new load schedule, the APC implements the new load 
schedule and the APC executioner changes the APC state from restorative to normal. 
C. APC Demonstration Results 
The capability of the APC has been successfully demonstrated. In the demonstration, the energy availability was 
calculated and provided to the vehicle manager. The vehicle manager proposed a load schedule and the APC was able 
to implement the new schedule.  In this demonstration, two different non-critical faults were inserted into the system 
to test the ability of the APC to correctly identify the issues and then move to the restorative state.  The first non-
critical fault introduced an excessive bias to one of the RPCs.  Next, one of the RPCs was failed open.  In both cases, 
the APC was able to detect and identify the fault, and correctly moved the APC state from normal to restorative.  After 
the fault was cleared, the APC state changes from restorative back to normal. 
In this demonstration, two different critical faults were inserted into the system. First, a feeder fault that shorts the 
line from MBSU1-1 to PDU1-1 was shorted (Figure 7).  The hardware system takes immediate action and will open 
the RBI output to turn off power to PDU1-1. In this situation, the recovery and restoration planner uses an algorithm 
to determine that power can be rerouted to the PDUs by using the cross tie.  The system reconfigures to power PDU2-
1 from MBSU1-1 and PDU1-1 from MBSU2-1. Using the cross ties to provide power to both PDUs does not impact 
the energy availability and therefore no loads are shed.  In addition, the energy availability and power profiles remains 
the same as shown in Table 1.  The faulted component, fault type, energy availability, and current load schedule (to 
indicate that no loads were shed) are sent to the vehicle manager.  The APC waits for a new load schedule to be sent.  
When the load schedule is received from the vehicle manger, the APC accepts the load schedule and the APC 
executioner moves the APC state from Emergency to Restorative.   
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For the second fault, a battery fault was 
simulated by adding a short from Bat2-1 to 
MBSU2-1.  In this case, RBI2-2 faults open 
(due to the short) and the APC fault manager 
detects and isolates the fault.  Note that for the 
current work, there is a requirement that the 
power available in eclipse and insolation are 
equal, therefore when the battery is removed 
from the system so is the solar array; the 
recovery and restoration planner will remove 
the MBSU connected to the battery from the 
system configuration, which for this system is 
MBSU2-1. In this case, the system 
reconfigures to power both PDU1-1 and PDU2-1 from MBSU1-1.  The nominal power (from the power profile) and 
the energy availability is reduced to about 50%, shown in Table 3, and several of the loads are shed (all loads after 
priority 8 are shed).  The APC executioner sends the vehicle manger the fault, faulted component, updated load 
schedule to indicate the shed loads, and the energy availability.  The APC waits for a load schedule to be proposed by 
the vehicle manager that meets the new energy availability, at which point the APC executioner changes the state from 
Emergency to Restorative. 
Once the system is in restorative state, if the fault is removed then the reset signal for the faulted component can 
be reset.  This triggers the recovery and restoration planner to reassess the system configuration based on the current 
list of faulted components and allow the now repaired component to come back on line.  A new energy availability is 
created based on the new system configuration.  The APC executioner notifies the vehicle manager of the updated list 
of faulted components and new energy availability.  Once the vehicle manager sends the new energy availability, then 
the APC executioner will move the APC state from Restorative to Normal.  
VII. Conclusion 
The capability of the autonomous power controller (APC) has been successfully demonstrated.  The essential 
capability of the autonomous power controller includes the ability to detect and identify faults, ability to automatically 
reconfigure the system based on identified faults, ability to recalculate the energy available to the loads based on the 
current configuration, and the ability to restore power to loads after a fault has been cleared (or fixed). The system 
that has been implemented employs a database to communicate to various APC subsystems; such as the fault manager, 
contingency planner, reactive layer, energy manager, and executioner; as well as the vehicle manager.  Now that the 
capability has been demonstrated on a simple two string system, the next step is to improve the system and add more 
fidelity.  This includes adding a messaging system for better communication between all the subsystems, adding 
historical data capturing for trending analysis in the database, enhance fault management capability include detecting 
and diagnosing multiple faults, and enhanced configuration with distributed energy storage devices.  This technology 
is critical to enabling human space exploration beyond low lunar orbit as well as future missions to Mars. 
References 
1 NASA Strategic Plan 2014, http://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/FY2014_NASA_SP_508c.pdf. 
2 Jeremy, F. et.al., “Autonomous Mission Operations,” 10.1109/AERO.2013.6496927, IEEE Aerospace Conference 
2013. 
3 Soeder, J.F., Dever, T.P., McNelis,A.M., Beach, R.F., Trase, L.M., and May, R.D., “Overview of Intelligent Power 
Controller Development for Human Deep Space Exploration,” AIAA-2014-3833, AIAA Propulsion and Energy 
Forum, 12th International Energy Conversion Engineering Conference, Cleveland, OH, July 28-30, 2014. 
4 May, R.D., et. al. “An Architecture to Enable Autonomous Control of Spacecraft,” AIAA-2014-3834, AIAA 
Propulsion and Energy Forum, 12th International Energy Conversion Engineering Conference, Cleveland, OH, July 
28-30, 2014. 
5 Dever, T.P., Trase, L.M., Soeder, J.F., “Application of Autonomous Spacecraft Power Control Technology to 
Terrestrial Microgrids,” AIAA-2014-3836, AIAA Propulsion and Energy Forum, 12th International Energy 
Conversion Engineering Conference, Cleveland, OH, July 28-30, 2014. 
 
 
Table 3. Power Profile after losing a solar array and batter with 
an Energy Availability for the 2 hour window of 5.76kW Hours 
 
Time 
(time unit) 
Peak Power 
(kW) 
Nominal Power 
(kw) 
1 7.68 2.88 
2 7.68 2.88 
3 7.68 2.88 
4 7.68 2.88 
… … …. 
24 7.68 2.88 
 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
11 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 May, R.D., and Loparo, K.A, “The Use of Software Agents for Autonomous Control of a DC Space Power 
System,” AIAA-2014-3861, AIAA Propulsion and Energy Forum, 12th International Energy Conversion 
Engineering Conference, Cleveland, OH, July 28-30, 2014. 
7 McNelis, A.M., Beach, R.F., Soeder, J.F., McNelis, N.B., May, R.D., Dever, T.P., Trase, L., “Simulation and 
Control Lab Development for Power and Energy Management for NASA Manned Deep Space Missions,”. AIAA-
2014-3835, AIAA Propulsion and Energy Forum, 12th International Energy Conversion Engineering Conference, 
Cleveland, OH, July 28-30, 2014. 
8 Deep Space Vehicle Power Architecture Description Document and Deep Space Habitat Test Bed Evolution, AES-
AMPS-RPT-002, January 15, 2013.   
9 SAE Space Power Standard AS5698, SAE Aerospace, February 18, 2012. 
10 Dy Liacco, Tomas E., The Adaptive Reliability Control System, IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and 
Systems, Vol. PAS-86, No. 5, May 1967. 
